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established a roadblock to combat the problem of vehicle operators endangering the lives of 
others when drinking and driving. 
Roadblocks had become common procedure during the years of 1986 and 1987. The 
Utah County Sheriffs Office had been conducting roadblocks since late in the year of 1984 
because of statistics proving the decrease in DUI arrests relative to the use of roadblocks. 
In 1983 The County Sheriffs department issued 264 alcohol related citations and had 193 
DUI arrests. There were 828 alcohol citations in 1984, and the DUI arrests rose to 293. 
Fewer roadblocks were used in 1985 because of severe weather conditions, and alcohol 
citations increased to 987 while DUI arrests dropped to 241. Alcohol related citations more 
than doubled to 2397 in 1986, and DUI arrests increased to 432. There had been 2396 
alcohol related citations as of October of 1987 with 467 DUI arrests. These statistics 
indicate the effectiveness of roadblocks detecting alcohol violators-far more than the 
standard roving patrol procedure. (R. 102). 
On August 1, 1987 the County Sheriffs office set up a roadblock located at the 
intersection of State Road 68 and 6800 North in the county area south-west of Lehi, Utah. 
The roadblock was authorized by Lt. David Lamph of the Utah County Sheriffs Office. 
The purpose of this roadblock was to check for driver's licenses, registrations, and alcohol 
violations. (R. 80). Orange reflective signs approximately 16 inches square were place on 
large highway cones in the middle of the roadway. Signs read "Sheriffs Roadblock 
Ahead" and were placed with burning emergency flares. Emergency lights on patrol 
vehicles were left in operation. (R. 79). 
In effect at that time was a written policy by the Utah County Sheriff specifying the 
guidelines to be followed for the operation of roadblocks. The purpose of the policy was 
to "protect the constitutional rights of those stopped at the checkpoint." (See Exhibit "A", 
the Sheriffs Department's Policy and Procedure for Checkpoints). Among the precautions 
enumerated in the Sheriffs procedure were the vesting of authority to establish roadblocks 
(in only the Sheriff, Bureau Commander, or Patrol Commander; field deputies could not 
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On February 28, 1989, a jury in the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork 
Department, Utah County, State of Utah found defendant/appellant guilty of DUL (R. 
229). The finding was entered in the court. (R. 285). Notice of Appeal was filed on 
March 13, 1989. (R. 73). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The United States Supreme Court has held that when properly administered and when 
the police officer's discretion is appropriately limited, roadblocks do not violate Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Particularly, the Court 
suggested the use of "roadblock-type checks" for questioning all oncoming traffic. Of 
primary concern to the Court was the balance between the overwhelming public concern of 
drunken driver hazards and the potential for abusive discretion by officers and unwarranted 
intrusion upon the individual which inappropriate roadblocks might produce. An oft-cited 
Kansas Supreme Court decision carefully considered the issue of intrusion. It established 
thirteen factors to be considered when determining whether the balancing test in a particular 
case should be weighed in favor of the State. In this case, all but one factor was followed; 
however, all need not be complied with in order to balance favorably to the State. 
The roadblock in question was established pursuant to specific guidelines delineated 
in a policy from the Utah County Sheriffs office and was followed accordingly. The 
arresting officer approached defendant/appellant and, upon his detection of the smell of 
alcohol and his observation of the defendant/appellant's performance in field sobriety tests, 
made a constitutionally permissible arrest. 
The lower court properly refused removal of three prospective jurors, given their 
unquestioned ability to render a fair and impartial judgment. One juror was challenged 
merely because of his moral disposition, yet such individual beliefs are no grounds for 
removal. Furthermore, a potential juror cannot be removed merely because that person 
enjoyed a very casual acquaintance with the prosecuting attorney over ten years before the 
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commencement of this trial. Only in instances of "close relationships" between a juror and 
either counsel, witnesses or affected parties may that individual be removed for cause. 
Finally, no grounds for removal for cause exist simply because one juror is familiar or 
associated with another juror. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE CONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF DUI ROADBLOCKS. 
A. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that roadblocks do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when properly administered 
and when the amount of the officers discretion is accordingly limited. 
There is no doubt that stopping an automobile and detaining its driver constitute a 
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). The issue in this case is whether, given 
appropriate guidelines for officers to follow and an appropriate amount of officer 
discretion, a particular roadblock meets the requirements for a lawful search and seizure or 
is "unreasonable" and therefore unconstitutional. Of primary concern in determining the 
constitutionality of DUI roadblocks is the balance between the individual's protection from 
unbridled governmental intrusion and the public's concern for safety upon our highways. 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of roadblock "checkpoints" in 
the case of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 540 (1976). There, the Border 
Patrol had established a checkpoint on a major highway located in San Clemente and away 
from the international border to check for illegal aliens crossing into the United States from 
Mexico. The Court held that a vehicle may be stopped at a checkpoint for brief questioning 
of its occupants, even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle contains 
illegal aliens, and that such stops are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court 
also held that the operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by a 
judicial warrant. 428 U.S. at 545. 
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The Supreme Court next addressed the issue of roadblocks in the Prouse case, supra. 
There a patrolman had randomly stopped a singled-out automobile to check the driver's 
license and the vehicle's registration, yet had noticed neither suspicious activity nor any 
traffic or equipment violations. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer detected the smell of 
marijuana and observed some on the car floor. The Court held that absent an "articulable 
and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not 
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for 
violation of the law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his 
driver's license and the vehicle's registration are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment." 
One critical distinction must be made between the Prouse case and the facts in the case 
at bar: the Prouse case denounced arbitrary, single-car stops, while the instant case 
involves multiple car stops. The issue in this case involves a roadblock established to apply 
to all vehicles passing through a designated area, unlike the arbitrary selection of only one 
individual automobile as in Prouse. 
While the Prouse case is not exactly on point, its analysis would still extend to 
roadblocks of any nature. The critical element in determining whether a roadblock spot-
check passes constitutional scrutiny, under the Prouse ruling, is the officer or patrolman's 
amount of discretion. The Court stated: 
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to 
impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by 
government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order 'to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions. . . . ' [Citations omitted.] 440 U.S. at 653. 
Though the Court in Prouse ruled as unconstitutional the search and seizure in that 
particular case, it did not, however, rule roadblocks unconstitutional per se. Instead, the 
Court ruled that it is constitutionally permissible for states to develop "spot checks that 
involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." One 
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alternative the Court suggested was the "questioning of all on-coming traffic at roadblock-
type stops " 440 U.S. at 663. 
The roadblock in question satisfies all bounds of "reasonableness" and in no way 
invites unbridled or abusive discretion by its enforcing officials. All attending officers are 
required to follow the specific procedure policies established by the County Sheriffs 
office. (See Exhibit "A"). The factors enumerated in that policy-including proper 
roadblock authorizations, safety considerations, detention periods and escape routes— 
carefully mind the very fundamental constitutional freedoms of citizens who will encounter 
such roadblocks. 
B. The sobriety roadblock in this case complied with appropriate guidelines and 
standards and therefore was not unconstitutional under the balancing of interests 
test. 
Defendant/appellant relies upon various decisions in other state courts which have 
ruled that roadblocks violate fourth amendment rights. Neither the decisions of those state 
courts nor the decision in a Utah District court cited by defendant/appellant is binding in 
this case. This court, however, has recently addressed the use of sobriety roadblocks in 
the case of State v. Stokes, Fourth Circuit Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
Case No. 87CR400, (See Exhibit "B") and should recognize that decision as controlling. 
Central to the court's decision was its weighing of the public's enormous concern 
regarding the threat of drunk drivers and the Fourth Amendment protections from abusive 
police searches. 
In Stokes, the defendant filed a Motion to Exclude, arguing that all evidence obtained 
by the roadblock stop resulted from an unconstitutional seizure which violated the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah. The court denied the defendant's Motion to Exclude and the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Davis found as follows: 
"[R]oadblocks must be approached on a case-by-case basis. Although a 
small number of courts have held sobriety roadblocks to be per se 
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unconstitutional, this Court does not find their reasoning persuasive. A 
majority of the courts finding a particular roadblock unconstitutional have 
suggested or intimated ways in which the fatal defect could have been 
cured." At p. 14. 
Pertinent to the Court's decision was the consideration of both explicit and implicit 
state statutory authority to conduct roadblocks. Though the Court in the Stokes case noted 
the absence of explicit statutory authority in the Utah Code authorizing DUI roadblocks, it 
did find implicit authority to conduct "roadblock activity." At p. 3. The following 
excerpts from the Utah Code were of the essence: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. The authority of 
municipal police officers to effect an arrest is likewise statutorily limited. 
U.CA. § 77-7-15 (1953), as amended. 
The members of the police force shall have the power and authority, 
without process, to arrest and take into custody any person who shall 
commit or threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the officer, or 
within his view, any breach of the peace, or any offense directly prohibited 
by the laws of this state or by its ordinance. U.CA. § 10-3-915 (1953), 
as amended. 
The court further held that sobriety roadblocks are not subject to the "probable cause" 
requirement. 
While some tenuous arguments might be made by analogy, this court finds 
that roadblocks do not fit the criteria and formulae establishing these 
particular probable cause exceptions. It is the opinion of this Court, rather, 
that roadblocks must be viewed under a balancing of interests analysis. In 
automobile search cases over the last few decades the Supreme Court has 
adopted the interest balancing approach, which is much less rigorous than 
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, (citing Delaware v. Prouse, supra: 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. supra: and United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975))." 
The court in Stokes held that the balancing of interests analysis, in effect, consists of 
determining whether sobriety roadblocks "effectively advance a significant public concern, 
and that the intrusiveness is reasonable." At p. 8. 
The first step of this balancing of interests analysis, the advancement of a significant 
public concern, requires prime consideration. Courts cannot ignore the overwhelming 
public interest of drunk drivers threatening the lives of innocent citizens. Consider, for 
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example, the following alarming statistics included in the Stokes court's decision: over 
25,000 persons are killed every year in alcohol-related traffic accidents; well over a half 
million more are injured. Property damage in alcohol-related accidents exceeds five billion 
dollars annually. As the court cites Justice Blackmun writing in Perez v. Campbell, the 
"slaughter on the highways exceeds the death toll of all our wars." 402 U.S. 637, 672 
(1971). The Stokes court continues: 
Nor has the issue escaped public outcry and protest. Numerous groups 
with catchy, aggressive acronyms have sprung into being in the past 
decade. Moreover, membership is growing at a rate generally unparalleled 
in civic interest groups, [citing, among others, MADD and RID nationally 
andREDDIinUtah]. Public awareness is at a new high. Pressure on law 
enforcement administrators may well be a driving reason for increased use 
of roadblocks. Nearly half the states use roadblocks to some degree in 
combating drunk drivers, [citation omitted]. Furthermore, supplemental 
incentive funds are available to those states which implement procedures 
recommended by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
which include the use of sobriety roadblocks. [Citation omitted]." At. p. 
9. 
This court should likewise recognize the compelling gravity of the public's justified 
concern regarding drunk drivers and the crucial role of roadblocks to detect those violators. 
The next step in the competing interests balance considers the individual's right to be 
free from intrusive searches. Again, in Stokes, the court cited authorities proving the very 
minimal intrusion upon the individual as a result of roadblocks: "Most roadblocks require 
only a few minutes of the motorist's time. [Citations omitted.] Usually the officer speaks 
momentarily to the driver and views the interior of the vehicle, checking for alcohol 
containers and weapon." [Citation omitted]. At p. 11. 
The sobriety roadblock in this case, one established pursuant to applicable authority 
and abiding by all applicable guidelines, hardly follows defendant/appellant's conjured 
image of arbitrary and abusive discretion demonstrated by the enforcing officers. The 
average length of time each motorist at this roadblock was stopped is not a matter of record 
with the Utah County Sheriffs Office. It is estimated, however, that the average length of 
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time a motorist is stopped at roadblocks conducted by the Utah County Sheriffs Office is 
between 30 seconds and one minute, unless a violation is detected. (R. 80). 
The Kansas Supreme Court carefully considered the intrusion aspect of DUI 
roadblocks in State v. Deskins. 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983). There the 
court held that a DUI roadblock at which the defendant had been arrested did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court 
established thirteen factors to be used when considering the intrusiveness of roadblocks 
when they are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Those factors, used when determining 
whether a DUI roadblock meets the balancing test in favor of the state, are as follows: 
1. The degree of discretion, if any,left to the officer in the field; 
2. The location designated for the roadblock; 
3. The time and duration of the roadblock 
4. Standards set by superior officers; 
5. Advance notice to the public at large; 
6. Advance warning to the individual approaching motorist; 
7. Maintenance of safety conditions; 
8. Degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation; 
9. Average length of time each motorist is detained; 
10. Physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of operation; 
11. The availability of less intrusive methods for combating the problem; 
12. The degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and 
13. Any other relevant circumstances which might bear upon the test. 
The disputed roadblock, established pursuant to Sgt. Dave Lamph's guidelines, 
complied with all but one of the above requirements, that of providing advance notice to the 
public through the media. However, noncompliance with only one of the criterion does not 
thwart the constitutionality of a roadblock. The court in Deskins, supra, stated: "Not all of 
the factors need to be favorable to the state but all which are applicable to a given roadblock 
should be considered." Id. at 1185. Given the state's enormous concern for protecting its 
citizens from drunken drivers and the slight inconvenience it may pose to highway 
travelers, this court should uphold the use of roadblocks in detecting and deterring those 
driving under the influence. 
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IL THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED REMOVAL FOR CAUSE 
THOSE JURORS WHO REMAINED COMPLETELY IMPARTIAL 
THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Defendant/appellant appeals the lower court's discretion in its refusal to remove for 
cause (1) venireman Gottfredson for his moral beliefs concerning alcoholic consumption, 
(2) venireman Ms. Searle for her previous work relationship with the prosecutor in the case 
and (3) venireman Shaffer for her familiarity with another venireman. None of the 
challenges are appropriate removals for cause. Furthermore, the presence of those 
individuals in no way hindered defendant/appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial before 
a jury. 
Defendant/appellant cites as authority U.C.A. § 77-35-18(e)( 14) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, but fails to cite the provision in its entirety. Read in its proper context, 
a challenge based only upon an opinion formed by a potential juror regarding the crime 
precludes any action for removal for cause. The latter-and most applicable-part of the 
section reads, 
. . . but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to 
such jury,... if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and 
will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
The lower court did not question venireman Gottfredson's ability to "act impartially and 
fairly," according to the above-cite section of the Utah Code. Given the court's appropriate 
discretion in the matter, Gottfredson should not have been removed for cause simply 
because of his moral belief concerning the consumption of alcohol. 
Trial courts are granted great discretion in determining the impartiality of potential 
jurors. Only if there is an grave abuse of that discretion will a court on appeal conclude that 
there was a reversible error. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States. 451 U.S. 182 (1981), 
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of jury selection on appeal: 
[T]he adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to review. The trial 
judge's function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later 
on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and 
credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of 
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responses to questions. [Citations omitted]. In neither instance can an 
appellate court easily second-guess the conclusions of the decision maker 
who heard and observed the witnesses. Id. at 188. 
The Court further upheld the importance of a lower court's role in the jury selection 
process. "Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with 
the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions,... judges 
have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire." 
451 U.S. at 189. There is absolutely no indication of an abuse of discretion by the lower 
court in its refusal to remove for cause those individuals who posed no threat to 
defendant/appellant's constitutional rights. 
Defendant/appellant's charge that venireman Gottfredson should have been removed 
solely because of his religious beliefs concerning alcohol is overwhelmingly contradicted 
by case law. Courts have routinely denied removal for cause those veniremen whose 
dispositions toward a particular offense are unquestioned. In United States v. Elliott. 849 
F.2d 554, (11th Cir. 1988), the defendant was convicted by a jury of drug-related charges. 
The court held that "a bias or prejudice towards a particular crime does not necessarily lead 
to potential actual prejudice against an accused." (Citation omitted). Id. at 561. 
Another case, United States v. Jones. 865 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1989) considered a 
defendant's charge that the lower court had erred in refusing to strike a venire panel 
member for cause. There, during the voir dire examination, one panel member openly 
expressed her strong opinion about drugs and even expressed her uncertainty whether it 
might "color or influence" the way she heard he evidence. The court held that the 
defendant was not entitled to have her struck for cause, despite her inclinations frankly 
stated. 
Undoubtedly, in a trial of any charge-be it drugs, child abuse, robbery, or even 
murder-there are going to be citizens morally opposed to the nature of the crime. Drinking 
and driving is no exception. But as another court has recently held in denying such 
removal for cause, the law does "not expect jurors to be free from all prejudices, however; 
12 
rather, the law requires them to be able to put aside their prejudices and determine guilt or 
innocence on the facts presented." Com, v. Smith, 540 A.2d 246, 256 (Pa. 1988). Given 
venireman Gottfredson's ability to impartially hear the facts in the instant case and render 
his judgment independent of whatever religious beliefs he may possess, the lower court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove him for cause. 
Defendant/appellant additionally questions the working relationship between the 
prosecuting attorney (Sherry Ragan) and one juror (Ms. Searle), as they taught some years 
earlier at the same elementary school. However, courts have uniformly rejected challenges 
for cause based upon acquaintances between jurors and counsel, unless the association was 
one of a "close relationship." In Com, v. Johnson, 445 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. 1982), the 
court held that a prospective juror should be excused when that person "has such a close 
relationship, be it familial, financial, or situational, with any of the parties, counsel, victims 
or witnesses." Id. at 511. [Emphasis added]. Another court in Ward v. Com, 695 
S.W.2d 404, (Ky. 1985) concurred, holding that legitimate grounds for removal exist if 
parties maintain close personal ties: "Once that close relationship is established, without 
regard to protestations for lack of bias, the court should sustain a challenge for cause and 
excuse the juror." Id. at 407. 
In the present case, counsel for the state and one juror were schoolteachers ten years 
prior to the trial. When the court asked her to characterize that friendship and asked if the 
two "were real close," venireman Ms. Searle answered, "No." Instead, she characterized 
her relationship with counsel as merely that of "just know[ing] her as another teacher." 
Furthermore, the court specifically asked Ms. Searle if she "would have any tendency to 
favor the State in this matter because who's the prosecutor, as opposed to the defense," to 
which she again answered "No." Finally, and most importantly, the court asked Ms. 
Searle if she thought she "could be totally fair and impartial," to which she responded 
"Yes." (See Exhibit "C"). 
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In State v. Benge. 110 Ariz. 473, 520 P.2d 843 (1974), the court denied defendant's 
challenge to lower court's refusal to remove one prospective juror on the basis of that 
person's brief acquaintance with the prosecuting attorney. The court acknowledged that 
jurors will invariably be familiar with attorneys on either side in any given case. 
"However, that alone is insufficient to demonstrate that the appellants were prejudiced by 
the acquaintance." Id. at 849. Whereas a potential juror may justifiably be removed if 
there exists a "close relationship" between that person and counsel, a "casual acquaintance" 
does not warrant removal. State v. Love, 43 So.2d 448 (La.App. 2nd. Cir 1983). 
Countless other cases have held likewise, that mere familiarity with counsel—be it a distant 
relative, neighbor, or business associate—is not enough to sustain a removal for cause. 
(See, e.g., United States v. Thomas. 676 F.2d 239 (C.A.Ind. 1980), certiorari denied 
Roberts v. United States. 449 U.S. 1091 (juror who was neighbor of government attorney 
was not prejudiced); Poole v. State. 432 So.2d 514 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983) (fact that 
venireman was second cousin to deputy district attorney was no ground for challenge for 
cause); Howard v. State. 420 So.2d 828 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982) (juror related to counsel in 
criminal case no grounds for removal); State v. Elmore. 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 
(S.C. 1983) (mere fact that any prospective juror is a friend or even a relative of counsel 
does not automatically disqualify the prospective juror)). 
Finally, defendant/appellant argues that venireman Ms. Shaffer should have been 
removed given her familiarity with venireman Ms. Vance and her conduct in turning to Ms. 
Vance and asking her a question. This contention must fail, given the complete lack of any 
evidence suggesting possible bias shared by the two jurors which would impede their 
ability to fairly and impartially hear the case. In Nichols v. State. 418 P.2d 77 (Okl.Cr. 
1966) a prospective juror was confused by one specific question, but clearly showed by his 
other answers that he was not biased or prejudiced and that he would try the case on the 
evidence and testimony presented. The court ruled that there had been no abuse of 
discretion when it overruled the defendant's challenge for cause. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court properly upheld as constitutional the use of DUI roadblocks to 
combat the enormous problem of drunk drivers on our highways when such checkpoints 
are properly administered and are not an abuse of police discretion. Given the startling 
national statistics of needless deaths attributable to those driving under the influence, DUI 
roadblocks effectively serve the public's legitimate state interest in sparing further carnage 
upon our country's highways. Moreover, when established pursuant to specific guidelines 
that are most conscientious of a citizen's constitutional protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, DUI roadblocks pose little intrusion upon those passing through an 
area where such protective measures are being enforced. 
The lower court properly refused defendant/appellant's challenges to remove for 
cause those prospective jurors who posed no threat of prejudice or bias toward the accused 
or the prosecuting attorney. All potential jurors will inevitably possess various beliefs or 
moral dispositions towards the nature of any crime. Individual attitudes, however, will not 
necessarily cloud a venireman's independent ability to fairly and impartially consider the 
facts in a certain case based upon the particular evidence and testimony presented. Absent a 
manifest and overtly expressed prejudice, a juror cannot be dismissed for cause merely 
because of individual predilections. 
Nor can a juror be removed based solely upon that person's familiarity with affected 
parties or counsel unless a "close relationship" exists. A working relationship between two 
school teachers existing over a decade before trial hardly qualifies as anything but a casual 
acquaintance, far less than what comprises a "close relationship." Furthermore, no 
grounds for removal exist merely because a juror inquires of another juror with whom she 
is associated, absent any demonstration of possible bias or prejudice. 
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge that the judgment of the lower court 
be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^1 *?r day of August, 1989. 
Sherry Kagan /y 
Deputy Utah Coiinty Attorney 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed to Mitch Zager, attorney for Defendant-
Appellant, 3167 West 4700 South, West Valley City, Utah, 84118, 
by placing said copy in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this 
;?Y^ r day of August, 1989. 
ADDENDUM 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE TO DISMISS 
Case, No, 881000303 
The Court has received and duly considered Defendant's motion to suppress 
or in the alternative to dismiss, including a statement of facts smd memorandum 
of points and authorities; the Court has also considered the response of the 
State of Utah; smd having heard testimony and oraJ. argument and being fully 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
RULING AND ORDER 
There is little dispute regarding the facts with respect to the 
establishment and operation of the roadblock and the stopping of the 
defendant. 
The roadblock was established by the Utah County Sheriff's Office 
following complaints by residents in the Saratoga area south of Lehi 
following am event called the sand drags. At the time, the Utah County 
Sheriff had in effect a written policy for operation of roadblocks. 
The Court finds that the roadblock in question complied with ten of 
the eleven factors set forth for consideration by the Court in State v. 
Despim, 6j3 P- 2d 1171* (Kansas 1983). The only factor absent was advance 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JOSEPH A. N0V0SEL, 
Defendant. 
-1-
notice to the general public through media'publicity. In this case the 
officers were supervised; all vehicles were detained until all officers 
were involved with a vehicle; the length of the stop and degree of 
intrusiveness was limited; safety procedures were in place and followed. 
The Court must balance the right of the operators and other occupants 
of vehicles to be free from unreasonable search and seizure against the 
interest of the State in ensuring that our public streets are safg. 
The Court recognizes the legitimate interest of the State in detecting 
unlicensed drivers and drivers operating vehicles while under the influence 
of alcohol. The Court also weighs heavily the rights of the individual 
and the police state atmosphere that can be created by Court condoned stop 
and seizure of citizens without reasonable suspicion. 
The Court finds that the operation of the roadblock in this case and 
subsequent arrest of the defendant was not an unreasonable stop and seizure 
of the defendant. The Motion To Suppress Or In The Alternative To Dismiss 
is hereby ordered, denied. 
The Clerk of Court is directed to set this matter for trial. 
DATED this 6th day of July, 1988. 
JohnAI Backlun&i Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING \J 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Ruling and Order to 
Sherry Ragan, Deputy Utah County Attorney, 37 East Center, Suite 200, Provo, Utah, 
0U601 and to Mitchel Zager, 3167 West VfQO South, Salt Lake City, Utah 8U118, this 
/ I <M^cLay of July, 1988. 
yCl'erk of Court " 
^ Utah County Sheriff 
^ ~ 7 1775 SOUTH DAKOTA LANE PROVO, UTAH 84601 PHONE 374-2211 
MACK HOLLEY 
Sheriff 
TO: Patrol Sergeants DATE: October 11, 1984 
FROM: Lt. David Lamph RE: Roadblocks 
Until such time as I am able to develop a more comprehensive 
policy in this matter the following will be used. 
1. The roadblock must be for a specific purpose, ie. drivers 
license/ registration alcohol violations/ etc. 
2. The need for the roadblock/ if other than license and regis-
tration violations/ should be borne out through the use of 
complaint reports/ extra patrol'requests/ or the deputy:s 
personal knowledge. 
3. The' sergeant on duty must be at the roadblock to supervise-
his deputies actions. 
C ^ 
4. If the sergeant is not on duty his designated senior patrol 
deputy must be at the roadblock. 
5. Deputies do not have the discretion to establish a non-
emergency roadlbock. 
6. There will He no less than three deputies at any non-emergency 
roadblock. This number may include the sergeaiv: or senior 
_ patrol deputy. ^ 
7. Roadblocks will be held in a safe location/ eg. not a blind 
curve. Drivers of vehicles should be allowed a large amount 
of reaction timp. and this should be in the deputies view* 
2 
8. The public has a right to travel the highway in safety. 
When the traffic has backed up to be a sufficient irritant 
to the public or a safety hazard you will direct traffic 
through stopping only the obvious violators. . 
9. There will be an obvious escape route made at the road-
block in the event a violator "runs" the roadblock. The 
escape route will be in such a location that the deputy 
is not in danger. 
10. Roadblocks should be established where there is enough room 
for the violator to pull off the roadway.
 m 
11. Chase vehicles will be positioned to apprehend those who 
\\ evade the roadblock. 
Patrol Commander 
TITLE 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
37 East Center St., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 373-0136 
IN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
REPLY TO SECOND 
Plaintiff, : REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
vs. 
JOSPEH A. NOVOSEL, Case No. 1-7437-87 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through its 
attorney, Carlyle K. Bryson, and in answer to defendants Second 
Request For Discovery provides the following information: 
1. The exact time the roadblock was established and 
dismantled are not matters of record with the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office. 
2. The names of all officers attending the roadblock are 
not matters of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
Officers attending a roadblock may change as demands elsewhere 
may require. Total number of officers was never less than 
requred by office policy. See Attachment #1. 
3. No advanced advertisement or media notice was given of 
this roadblock. 
4. The roadblock was located at the intersection of State 
Road 68 and 6800 North in the county area south-west of Lehi, 
Utah. 
5. See attachment #1. 
6. See attachment #1. 
7. The number of persons stopped at the roadblock is not a 
matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
8. The number of "DUI" arrests made at the roadblock is not 
a matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
9. The number and nature of other arrests at the roadblock 
are not matters of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 
10. The number and nature of other citations issued at the 
roadblock are not matters of record with the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office. 
11. This question is repetitive of question #18. See 
question #18 answer. 
12. The average length of time each motorist at this 
roadblock was stopped is not a matter of record with the Utah 
County Sheriff's Office. It is estimated that the average length 
of time a motorist is stopped at roadblocks conducted by the Utah 
County Sheriff's Office is between 30 seconds and one minute 
unless a violation is detected. 
13. This question is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its 
present form. 
14. The roadblock was authorized by Lt. David Lamph, Utah 
County Sheriff's Office pursuant to attachment #1. 
15. The purpose of this roadblock was to check for Driver's 
License, Registration and alcohol violations. 
16. Part one of this question related to Ma description of 
the number of police vehicles" is ambiguous and cannot be 
answered in its present form. The location of police vehicles at 
the time of the roadblock varied as vehicles arrived and 
departed, 
17. All officers attending the roadblock were uniformed 
officers. The total number of officers at the roadblock varied 
depending on various factors. That part of this question related 
to "their positions" is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its 
present form. 
18. Orange reflective signs approximately 16 inches square 
were placed on large highway cones in the middle of the roadway. 
Signs read "Sheriff's Roadblock Ahead" and were placed with 
burning emergency flares. Emergency lights on patrol vehicles 
were left in operation. 
DATED this 7th day of October, 1987. 
KAY BRYSON { _ -J_ 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
37 East Center St., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 373-0136 
JN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
RESPONSE TO 
Plaintiff, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
vs. 
JOSPEH A. NOVOSEL, Case No. 1-7437-87 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Deputy County Attorney, John Allan, on behalf of 
the State of Utah, and hereby responds to Defendant's motion to 
suppress as follows: 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prosecution admits to 'paragraphs 1-3 as being true. 
2. Paragraph 4 is correct in that there is no written 
record of the time the roadblock was set up or dismantled. 
However, the officers on duty do mentally recall the approximate 
times of those activities. 
3. Paragraph 5 is incorrect in that the officers 
conducting the roadblock were those officers on Sergeant Jim 
Tracy's alcohol crew. 
4. Prosecution admits to paragraph 6 and 7. 
5. Paragraphs 8,9 and 10 are incorrect in that all 
citations given at that roadblock could be counted and calculated 
accordingly. Therefore, there is a record of those arrests and 
citations. 
6. Prosecution admits to paragraph 11. 
7. Paragraph 12 is incorrect in that each officer is 
familiar with the restrictions out Lined by Sergeant Dave Lamph. 
Said restrictions specifically outline safety precautions and the 
purpose for each and every roadblock. 
8. In response to paragraph 13, the County Sheriff's 
Office has been conducting roadblocks since late in the year of 
1984. Roadblocks became common procedure during the years of 
1986 and 1987. In L983 the County Sheriff's department issued 
264 alcohol related citations and had 193 Driving Under the 
Influence arrests. In J984 alcohol citations were 828 and 
Driving Under the Influence arrests rose to 293. In the year 
1985 alcohol citations increased to 987 and DUI arrests dropped 
to 241 (less roadblocks were used that year because of severe 
weather conditions). In 1986 alcohol related citations more than 
doubled to 2397 and DUI arrests increased to 432. Through 
October of 1987 there have been 2396 alcohol related citations 
issued and 467 DUI arrests. From these statistics it is evident 
that roadblocks are more effective in detecting alcohol violators 
than the standard roving patrol procedure. 
9. Prosecution admits to paragraph 14. 
10. Prosecution admits to paragraph 15; however, if the 
defendant would prefer, a long form information wi LI be prepared 
charging him with that offense also. 
11. In response to paragraph 16, the County Sheriff's 
department did receive several oral complaints concerning the 
alcohol problem in the area. In fact, one of the complainants 
deLivered a flyer stating the exact date, time, and location of 
the sand drags in order that law enforcement might be increased 
in the area. 
II. 
DUI ROADBLOCKS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Case of Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. ct. 1391 (1973), held 
that at random stops without probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion was an unconstitutional seizure under the fourth 
amendment of the constitution. The Court, however, went on to 
say that the "Questioning of all on-coming traffic at roadblock-
type stops is one possible alternative." In fact, prior to 
Prouse, a roadblock was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in State v. Martiney Fuerte, 96 S. ct. 3074 (1976). In 
that case the Court held that roadblocks near Mexican borders to 
check for illegal aliens was constitutional. 
The states of New Jersey, Kansas, Oregon, Indiana, Colorado 
and California have all found roadblocks to be constitutional. 
Most of these cases have cited Prouse v. Delaware as the 
precedent for doing so. The States of Massachusetts, Texas, 
Arizona, and South Dakota have held roadblocks unconstitutional. 
Many have researched and considered why there is a discrepancy 
between the states. The Court in State v. Deskins, 673 p. 2d 
1174 (Kansas 1983), came out with a list of eleven points it felt 
need be considered in order to assure a constitutional roadblock. 
That list reads as follows: 
1) Advance notice to the public at large through media 
publicity; 
2) Location selected and procedure developed by superior 
officer; 
3) Degree of discretion left to the officer in the field; 
4) Method of warning to individual motorists approaching 
the roadblock; 
5) Reason for the location designated for the roadblock; 
6) Time and duration of the roadblock; 
7) Maintenance of safety conditions; 
8) Average length of time each motorist is detained; 
9) Physical factors surrounding the location, type, and 
method of operation; 
10) Degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of 
operation; and 
11) Any other relevant circumstances which might bear on the 
test. 
Considering the roadblock in question and the guideline set out 
by Sergeant Dave Lamph it is apparent that this roadblock met ten 
of the eleven recommendations, only failing recommendation number 
1 in that advance notice to the public through the media was not 
supplied. However, overlooking a single recommendation does not 
destroy the constitutionality of the roadblock. Again in the 
Deskins case supra, the court stated: 
Not all of the factors need to be favorable 
to the state but all which are applicable 
to a given roadblock should be considered. 
Id at 1185. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident that the officers conducting the roadblock did 
adequately comply with the standards as set out in State v. 
Deskins. These and similar standards have become the basis for 
determining whether a roadblock is constitutional or not. 
Because the roadblock in question was created and handled with 
the above recommendations in mind, it should be upheld as 
constitutional. On that basis, defendant's motion to suppress, 
or in the alternative dismiss, all evidence obtained from said 
roadblock should be denied. 
DATED this 30th day of November, 1987. 
JOHN L. ALLAN 




The Sheriff's Department, to make the most economical 
use of its deputies and equipment, will establish 
checkpoints at various locations in Utah County. These 
checkpoints will be used, primarily, to enforce Utah 
State vehicle registration, drivers license, and 
inspection requirements. 
The following procedure will be implemented and 
followed to protect the Constitutional rights of those 




Only the Sheriff, Bureau Commander, or Patrol 
Commander may initiate a checkpoint. 
a. Field deputies do not have authority to 
establish checkpoints. 
b. The supervisor who initiates the checkpoint 
will designate the deputy in charge at the 
scene. 
The deputy in charge at the scene will. 
a. Initiate a complaint report. 
b. Fill out UCSD OPForm 16 (Exhibit 1) 
Ensure the checkpoint is set up and operated in 
a safe manner. 
1) The following will be taken into account. 
a) Speed of the highway. 
b) Visibility. 
c) Weather conditions. 
d) Amount of traffic. 
e) Width of the road. 
(1) There must be sufficient room 
for a violator to be removed 
from the roadway. 
No less than three(3) deputies will be allowed to 
operate a checkpoint. 
Advance notice to the public will be made in 
the following manner. 
a. The Patrol Commander, or his dejiqnee, will 
place one advertisement in a local paper, 
having general circulation, a month stating: 
NOTICE 
During the month of the Utah 
County Sheriff's Department will be 
establishing checkpoints throughout Utah 
County. These checkpoint will be used to 
determine the validity of drivers licenses, 
registrations and safety inspections. 
b. Signs will be placed prior to the checkpoint by 
the deputy in charge. 
1) The signs will state "Caution Sheriff's 
checkpoint ahead", or "Caution Sheriff's 
roadblock ahead". 
2) The signs will be lighted by a flare during 
the hours of darkness and be placed so as 
to give advanced warning. 
The deputy in charge will ensure that an escape 
route is made at the checkpoint in the event a 
driver "runs" the checkpoint. The escape route 
will be in such a location that the public and 
deputies are not in danger. 
Chase vehicles will be positioned to apprehend 
those who attempt to evade the checkpoint. 
The public will be detained no longer that is 
necessary to check for violations of the State 
Code. 
a. If traffic is backed up tc where the 
detention will be longer than ten minutes 
the traffic will be passed through the 
checkpoint with only the obviois violations 
stopped. 
1) This will continue until the detention 
will be of short duration. 
Flares (depending on light conditions) and Cones 
will be used to delineate traffic 
lanes. 
ROADBLOCK EVALUATION 
)ATE START TIME END TIME CRtt — 
DEPUTY IN CHARGE 
PURPOSE OF ROADBLOCK 
LOCATION 
LEATHER & ROAD COND. 
DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC 
MUMBER OF DEPUTIES NAMES 
MUMBER OF SIGNS — 
WARNING SIGN LOCATION ( MUMBER OF YARDS FROM POR) 
APPROX. NUMBER OF STOPS 
NUMBER OF ARRESTS 
DUI ALCOHOL MISD. TRAFFIC 
DIAGRAM ROAD LOCATION BELOW 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
State of Utah 
V. Case No. 87CR400 
Frank Reynolds Stokes 
Defendants Motion to Exclude Evidence and to Dismiss was 
heard on December 10, 1987 with the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, 
presiding. The State of Utah was represented by Sherry Ragan, 
Deputy Utah County Attorney and defendant was represented by Steven 
Lybbert, Esq. At issue is whether a warrantless temporary 
roadblock, which is established to apprehend persons driving under 
the influence of alcohol, and which stops automobiles without any 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, produces constitutionally 
permissible arrests. Defendant's motion was made on the ground that 
all evidence obtained from the stop as the result of an 
unconstitutional seizure violated the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Art. I Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah. The State urged the Court to uphold the stop in this case 
based on public interest 
It is uncontested that the defendant in this case was 
stopped at a roadblock set up by the Utah County Sheriff's Office on 
state road 92 in American Fork Canyon at 11:25 p.m. on June 19, 
1987. Defendant was observed seated in the driver's seat, driving. 
The Court took the matter under advisement for the purpose 
of further researching the applicable law. The Court, having heard 
oral arguments and having reviewed the respective memoranda, and 
being fully advised in the premises, now rules as follows: 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals 
has had the occasion to analyze the constitutionality of roadblocks 
to detect drivers under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Nor has 
either court addressed the issue of roadblocks conducted for 
administrative purposes. 1 The United States Supreme Court has 
never ruled on the constitutionality of a non-permanent, "routine" 
sobriety roadblock and thus has not conclusively balanced the 
competing Fourth Amendment interests. 
Several Utah State trial courts, both district and circuit, 
have addressed sobriety roadblocks, resulting in a split of 
authority. 2 While the depth of analysis and decisive factors in 
these cases vary significantly, they do provide some guidance. 
However, opinions which lack a detailed reference to the oeprational 
facts, guidelines, standards and policies of the respective law 
enforcement agencies offer limited concrete guidance. Only one of 
the cases references 
1 
the Constitution of Utah; none address the issue of statutory 
authorization for roadblocks; and all the decisions appear to 
rely exclusively on general Fourth Admendment jurisprudence 
arguments. These decisions parallel the vast majority of 
courts which also conduct their analysis exclusively upon 
Fourth Amendment terms. 
I. STATE STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS 
The major question before the Court is whether, 
irrespective of constitutional questions, Utah law enforcement 
agencies are authorized by State law to establish checkpoints 
where vehicles are stopped for sobriety investigation or 
administrative purposes. 
Sheriffs and their deputies are granted authority to 
preserve the peace and make all lawful arrests. (3) But, there 
is no expressed authority found in Utah law which would 
sanction roadblock activities. In order to enforce "Driving 
Under the Influence" (DUI) laws, law enforcement agencies must 
rely upon general police powers to provide for public safety 
and welfare. Some implication of a specific charge to enforce 
DUI laws is found in the supplemental state excise tax on beer 
to fund rehabilitation and police efforts to combat the 
epidemic. 6 
Since Utah has not considered a roadblock case, it has 
never addressed the attendant issue of "explicit v. implicit" 
authority, although other jurisdictions have done so. States 
remain divided on the issue. The Oregon Supreme Court, in the 
recent case of Nelson v. Lane County, observed, 
Roadblocks are seizures of the person or the person's 
effects. For this reason, the authority to conduct 
roadblocks cannot be implied. Before they search or 
seize, executive agences must have explicit authority 
from outside the executive branch. (emphasis added)7 
This case was a civil action, brought for declaratory 
judgment. The court noted that the authority relied upon by 
the state police was not sufficiently specific, leaving open 
the possibility that a direct statute would cure the authority 
deficiency. In reliance upon that opinion the Oregon Supreme 
Court also decided two other roadblock cases on the same day. 
In both cases, evidence obtained at the roadblock was ordered 
suppressed.8 In another civil case, brought for injunctive 
relief, the California Supreme Court denied a writ of mandate 
which was sought to prevent the California Highway Patrol from 
operating roadblocks. The court termed the roadblocks as part 
of a regulatory scheme, authorized by state law. 9 
An Oklahoma court, in State v. Smith, was not persuaded 
with the state's theory that would sanction roadblock stops on 
2 
the basis of its police power to provide for public safety and 
welfare. The court found ". . .no statutory authority which 
would support, directly or indirectly, the state's contention 
that it has the power to establish checkpoints to inspect all 
motorists to discern if any are intoxicated."10 
On the other hand, persuasive argument can be made for 
implicit authority. An appellate court of Illinois stated that 
"criminal statutes do contain an implied right of the police to 
enforce them. While there are state and federal constitutional 
limitations on the means of enforcement, these limits are 
constitutional and not inherent in every criminal statute .... 
(A)bsent evidence of some contrary intent, the police should be 
able to enforce those laws in a constitutional manner." 
(emphasis added) 11 
Even though the Oregon Court in Nelson reached a 
contrary result, it summarized the "implicit authority" 
argument in the following language: 
Much criminal and regulatory law enforcement activity 
takes place pursuant to authority implied from a broad 
statutory directive. A broad directive to enforce 
criminal laws, . . . together with the specification 
of crimes developed by lawmakers, implies authority to 
undertake tasks necessary to carry out the delegated 
function. By and large, agencies of the executive 
branch are free to carry out their assigned 
responsibilities in ways of their own choosing. Making 
explicit the manner in which an agency is to accomplish 
its task falls to the agency head or that official's 
designee to instruct or sub-delegate to subordinate 
officials. 12 
This Court finds implicit authority to conduct the 
roadblock activity. Finding such authority, however, our 
inquiry is not complete. We must further examine any extant 
statutory limitations. Consider the language of the following 
excerpts from the Utah Code: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
The authority of municipal police officers to effect an 
arrest is likewise statutorily limited. 13 
The members of the police force shall have the power 
and authority, without process, to arrest and take into 
custody any person who shall commit or threaten or 
attempt to commit in the presence of the officer, or 
within his view, any breach of the peace, or any 
offense directly prohibited by the laws of this state 
or by its ordinance. 14 
3 
The foregoing statutory restraints may arguably be more 
stringent than Fourth Amendment restraints. While Utah law 
requires "reasonable suspicion11 as a necessary prerequisite to 
making a stop, the Fourth Amendment does not always so 
require. While the United States Supreme Court has required 
"some quantum of individual suspicion" as a general 
prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure, it has 
ruled that the Fourth Amendment imposes no "irreducible 
requirement" of such suspicion. The Court has carved out a few 
established and well-delineated exceptions dealing with airport 
security, zoning violation enforcement, border control 
activity, frisk searches and warrantless administrative 
searches of commercial property. 15 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not begun the analytical 
process with the assumption that officers are entitled to 
conduct any search or seizure not specifically proscribed by 
the Fourth Amendment. In the case of Colonnade Corp, v. United 
States, the Court ordered suppression of evidence seized by an 
unconsented search because the officers lacked statutory 
authority, even though their actions would not have violated 
the Fourth Amendment. 16 The court in Nelson v. Lane County, 
stated that it ". . . had often stressed the need to examine 
statutory authority and the limitations imposed by the 
authority before reaching any constitutional question." 17 
This court will allow a stop at a sobriety roadblock without 
individualized suspicion as being distinctive from the 
statutory imperative requiring individualized- suspicion for a 
singular vehicle stop. Satisfaction of this requirement alone 
is insufficient. This Court must also consider further state 
constitutional concerns.. 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
The right of the people to secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
It is notable that the language of the Constitution of 
Utah, Art I, Section 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
In many cases, state constitutions may provide greater 
limitation on the powers designated to the government than do 
the parallel provisions in the Constitution of the United 
States. The state courts have the latitude to look to their 
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respective consitutions. 18 "Structural differences in the 
state and federal constitutions and matters of particular state 
interest or local concern are two factors to be considered in 
developing an independent body of state constitutional law." 19 
The court in Kirk found that the subject roadblock was 
unconstitutional since it rested too heavily on the discretion 
of the field officers. The well-reasoned opinion was "rendered 
on state constitutional grounds, exclusively, not on federal 
constitutional grounds." 20 Another recent roadblock decision 
relied solely on state constitutional grounds to find a 
roadblock unconstitutional. 21 
The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the wisdom of a 
separate body of state constitutional law. Writing in Michigan 
v. Long. Justice O'Connor noted that "it is fundamental that 
state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting 
their state constitutions." 22 In State v. Hunt, Justice 
Handler wrote that a state constitution" . . . . is a more 
appropriate vehicle to resolve questions concerning the rights 
of its citizens to travel the highways of our state without 
police interdiction and the rights of the police to use 
reasonable methods to enforce our traffic laws than is the 
federal constitution." 23 The landmark case of Delaware v. 
Prouse, often cited in support of roadblocks, acknowledged that 
highway safety and law enforcement is primarily a local 
concern. 24 
Nearly every court which has addressed the 
constitutionality of roadblocks stop has adopted a balancing 
test involving factors of public interest and individual right 
to personal security, free from arbitrary interference by law 
enforcement officers. Thus, the permissibility of a particular 
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion 
of-the citizen's Article I Section 14 interests against its 
promotion of legitimate interests of the state. One can make a 
compelling argument that the state constitutional analysis is a 
"more appropriate vehicle" to resolve the competing state and 
personal interests. Regardless, the prominent balancing test 
advanced in Brown v. Texas is equally applicable to a state or 
federal constitutional analysis. While the majority of the 
arguments rely upon Fourth Amendment cases and concerns, most 
are applicable to a state constitutional consideration; the 
competing interests are the same. 25 
Justice Michael D. Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court 
has observed that "the whole question of the protections that 
are affordable by and the remedies available under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, (Utah's) own search and 
seizure provision has never been carefully considered by (the 
Utah Supreme) Court." State v. Hyge, 711 p.2d 264, 271-74 
(Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Mendoza, 71 
Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
We believe that it is fair to say that the Utah Supreme 
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traditionally followed the federal lead on search and seizure 
cases; it has not departed dramatically from the growing body 
of federal law in its analysis. 
While Utah has developed no independent or separate 
body of state constitutional law, both Justices Durham and 
Zimmerman have expressed a willingness to seriously consider an 
analytical approach premised upon article I, section 14 
arguments. State v. Earl. 716 p. 2d 803, State v. Bishop. 717 
p. 2d, 272, (Concurring, Durham J. Const. Art 5 & 1 grounds), 
State v. Mendoza, 7 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29, (concurring 
opinion), State v. Mastbaum, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, (dissenting 
opinion), State v. Hvah, 711 p. 2d 264, 271-74, (concurring 
opinion), American Fork City v. Crosarove, 701 p. 2d 1069 
(Utah 1985); (State Constitution's self-incrimination 
provision, Construction, Art. 1, Section 12 is relied upon in 
Justice Durham's majority opinion). (Justice Zimmerman, in his 
concurring opinion suggested an Article I, Section 14 
analysis). Justice Zimmerman stated in Hvae, p. 273, that "the 
federal law as it currently exists is certainly not the only 
permissible interpretation of the search and seizure 
protections contained in the Utah Constitution." There is 
reason to believe that such an analysis may extend the scope of 
individual protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures beyond that accorded by the Fourth Amendment. 
In State v. Earl, 716 p. 2d 803, 805,806 (Utah 1986), 
Justice Durham, in her majority opinion, noted that neither the 
State nor defendant had discussed or relied independently on 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. She further 
noted that despite the Court's willingness to independently 
interpret the Utah Constitution in other areas of the law, "the 
analysis of state constitutional issues in criminal appeals 
continues to be ignored.11 J. Durham concludes with: "It is 
imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state 
constitutional questions.11 J. Zimmerman reemphasized that 
position emphatically in Hygh, p. 272, stating, "sound 
arguments may be made in favor of positions at variance with 
the current federal law respecting both the scope of the 
individual's right to be free from warrantless searches and 
seizures and the remedy for any violation of that right." 
Arguments may be advanced respecting constitutionality 
under the Constitution of Utah, and Constitution of the United 
States. Similar though they may be one cannot make the error 
of proceeding to one without examination of the other. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court recently underscored that "a 
procedure may be perfectly in accord with the United States 
Constitution and yet run afoul of state constitutional or 
statutory requirements." 27 
This court finds that neither counsel has adequately 
articulated arguments premised on state constitutional 
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grounds. Since the issue has not been squarely briefed, this 
court must turn to Fourth Amendment arguments. 
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVES 
A. Roadblocks are Seizures Within the Meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, and Thus Must Be Applied to Fourth, 
Amendment Criteria. 
It is well-established that roadblocks and checkpoints 
are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 28 
Thus, after all other concerns have been addressed, the 
roadblock must meet the requirements for a lawful search and 
seizure. The traditional test demands both that a warrant be 
obtained and that there be probable cause. 29 The Supreme 
Court continues to stress that legitimate excusal of the 
warrant requirement does not affect the probable cause 
requirement. 30 There are few established exceptions to the 
probable cause requirement. .. Among these are "Terry-type" stop 
and frisk detentions, border searches, administrative 
inspections, inspections of heavily regulated enterprises, 
airport security checks, and inspection of ocean-going vessels 
in U.S. waters. 31 
It is probable that roadblocks pass muster under the 
Carroll doctrine as a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement. The Carroll Court established that an officer can 
conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if "it is not 
practical to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be 
quickly moved." 32 The Court looked forward to potential abuse 
of the newly-formed doctrine and cautioned: 
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a 
(government) agent were authorized to stop every 
automobile on the chance of finding liquor ... (T)hose 
lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public 
highways, have a right to free passage without 
interruption or search unless there is known to a 
competent official authorized to search probable cause 
for believing that their vehicles are carrying 
contraband or illegal merchandise. 33 
It is critical to recall that the Fourth Amendment protects 
"people, not places." 34 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed 
the restraint required in exercising the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, the Court stated, "The Carroll doctrine does not 
declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. 
Automobile or no automobile there must be probable cause for 
the search.." 35 
B. Sobriety Roadblocks are Subject to a Balancing 
of Interest Analysis in Determining Constitutionality. 
Sobriety roadblocks are not based upon probable cause. 
The Court must then examine the acceptable deviations from the 
probable cause requirement. Obviously, a roadblock is not 
similar to established probable cause exceptions such as 
heavily regulated enterprises, permanent border crossings, 
boarding of ship on the seas, or health and safety code 
enforcement. While some tenuous arguments might be made by 
analogy, this court finds that roadblocks do not fit the 
criteria and formulae establishing these particular probable 
cause exceptions. It is the opinion of this Court, rather, 
that roadblocks must be viewed under a balancing of interests 
analysis. In automobile search cases over the last few decades 
the Supreme Court has adopted the interest balancing approach, 
which is much less rigorous than traditional Fourth Amendment 
analysis. 36 However, the Court has not stated that it would 
employ a balancing test in all types of automobile searches. 
In Brown v. Texas, a seminal case advancing the balancing 
analysis in automobile searches, the Court said it would apply 
the balancing test to "seizures that are less intrusive than a 
traditional arrest.11 37 
The Brown Court outlined the three stage balancing 
analysis as follows: The first step considers the gravity of 
public concerns served by the seizure as demonstrated by 
specific, objective facts. Second, the degree to which the 
seizure advances the public interest must be considered. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, the severity of the 
intrusion on individual liberty will be weighed. 38 If 
sobriety roadblocks are to stand under the Fourth Amendment, it 
must be shown that they effectively advance a significant 
public concern, and that the instrusiveness is reasonable. 
C. The Public Interest in Detecting Intoxicated Drivers 
is of Sufficient Magnitude to Warrant Extraordinary 
Enforcement Approaches. 
Without hesitation, any court may take judicial notice 
of the national concern with the drunk driver. Various figures 
are touted in the pages of newspapers and on the evening news 
to illustrate the epidemic gravity of the problem. Best 
estimates place the number of persons killed in alcohol-related 
trffic accidents at 25,000 annually. 39 Well over an 
additional half million are injured. 40 Property damage is 
estimated to exceed five billion dollars annually. 41 Congress 
has acted to deprive federal highway funds to those states not 
enacting strict DUI enforcement provisions. 42 The Supreme 
Court has cited the plight of drunk driving in South Dakota v. 
Neville, stating "the situation underlying this case -— that of 
the drunken driver—occurs with tragic frequency on our 
highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is 
well-documented and needs no detailed recitation here." 43 
Justice Blackmun, writing in Perez v. Campbell, noted that the 
"slaughter on the highways exceeds the death toll of all our 
wars." 44 Several state courts have unequivocally held the 
state interest to be compelling and overwhelmingly infavor of 
the state. 45 
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Nor has the issue escaped public outcry and protest. 
Numerous groups with catchy, aggressive acronyms have sprung 
into being in the past decade. Moreover, membership is growing 
at a rate generally unparalleled in civic interest groups. 46 
Public awareness is at a new high. Pressure on law enforcement 
administrators may well be a driving reason for increased use 
of roadblocks. Nearly half the states use roadblocks to some 
degree in combating drunk drivers. 47 Furthermore, 
supplemental incentive funds are available to those states 
which implement procedures recommended by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, which include the use of 
sobriety roadblocks. 48 
Data respecting traffic fatalities in Utah are compiled 
by the Utah Highway Safety Division of the Utah Department of 
Public Safety and are published in its annual report. In 1986, 
for example, 104 of the 312 reported fatalities were 
alcohol-related and in 1987, 82 of the 297 fatalities were 
alcohol-related. (1986 Utah-Traffic Accident Summary; 1987 Utah 
Traffice Accident Summary; Published and compiled by the 
Division of Highway Safety of the Utah Department of Public 
Safety.) It is well documented that Utah's proportionate 
number of fatalities associated with drinking drivers is 
considerably lower than the national average; nationally, 
approximately 50 percent of all traffic fatalities occur in 
alcohol-related accidents. Regardless of the statistical 
comparison with other states, fatalities occur with tragic 
frequency. The data support fact that Utah has a significant 
problem with the drinking driver. These statistics make it 
painfully obvious that the risk posed to innocent drivers and 
pedestrians by those who drink and drive is substantial. 
The gravity of concern in Utah is evidenced by the 
extensive history of legislative reforms aimed at "toughening" 
drunk driving statutes. Because of citizen demands, intense 
lobbying efforts and public outrage, the legislature within the 
last decade has significantly increased the amount of fines, 
added a "victim restitution" provision, reduced the level of 
presumption, provided for an assessment and educational series, 
added an "implied consent" statute and provided for mandatory 
encarceration. 
Based upon the above, this Court is compelled to 
recognize the gravity of the public concern and takes judicial 
notice of the same. 
D. The Efficacy of Roadblocks in Detection, 
Apprehension and Deterrence of the Drinking 
Driver. 
One author has classed roadblocks as "woefully 
deficient" in solving the DUI problem. 49 On the other side, 
in State v. Superior Court, the Arizona Supreme Court held that 
the state had demonstrated a decrease in DUI accidents due to 
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the use of Arizona Department of Public Safety roadblocks. A 
decrease of approximately 3.5% (at Christmas season, 
traditionally at time of increases) was characterized by the 
court as significant. 50 In what is perhaps the most 
exhaustive scholarly treatment of DUI roadblocks to date, 
Professors James B. Jacobs and Nadine Strossen examine 
extensive statistical evidence and conclude that the evidence 
supporting the efficacy of sobriety checkpoints is, at best, 
inconclusive. 51 
The number of potential offenders deterred by 
roadblocks is debatable. For example, one court concluded that 
"common sense alone" was sufficient to conclude that roadblocks 
are effective deterrent measures. 52 In Delaware, the 
lieutenant governor has credited highway patrol sobriety 
roadblocks with a 23% decrease in alcohol related fatalities. 
53 On the other hand, in a recent Arizona case, the court 
noted that of 5,763 vehicles stopped at the subject roadblock, 
only 14 drivers were arrested for DUI (no data is available as 
to the number of these that were eventually convicted.) 54 
That shows a mere 1 out of every 412 vehicles. Such minimal 
success can hardly be expected to deter offenders. A study by 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the 
researchers concluded that after the study of multiple 
roadblocks in two different programs, no deterrent effect was 
demonstrated. 55 However, France and Sweden have used 
roadblocks for over five years and found a significant 
deterrent effect. 56 After reviewing such inconsistent data 
it seems fair, at least at this point, to agree with Jacobs and 
Strossen in characterizing empirical roadblock data as 
"inconclusive" at best. 57 Plaintiff has offered no data, 
except for generic statements of law enforcement officers, 
showing local efficacy in apprehension, or at least 
deterrence. The officers did testify that they thought they 
were more effective than road patrol for the apprehension of 
drunk drivers. Upon cross examination, officer Adamson 
admitted that no data has been compiled except in 
individualized cases. Mere inconclusive data should not alone 
prevent the use of roadblocks. No court has even attempted to 
construct a standard against which empirical data should be 
measured. It is the opinion of this Court that courts should 
not be transformed into centers of accountancy to supplant 
their role in serving law and justice. The testimony of the 
officers, based upon day to day pragmatics, while not 
statistically conclusive is sufficient. Officer Adamson 
testified that roadblocks had been "extremely effective in 
curbing alcohol violations." 
E. The "Neutral Criteria" Examined: 
Limited and Controlled Intrusion 
Upon the Motoristfs Liberty in the 
Administration of Roadblocks. 
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This Court now turns to the third, and final, element 
of the balancing analysis: the severity of intrusion upon the 
motoristfs Fourth Amendment interest. Many courts have 
proceeded directly to this facet of the analysis, disregarding 
completely the first two steps, or taking judicial notice of 
their fulfillment. In Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, the 
Supreme Court weighed both objective and subjective intrusion 
in considering the constitutionality of a permanent immigration 
checkpoint. The element of objective intrusions include the 
stop itself, the physical inspection, and the questioning of 
the motorist. 58 Generally, the objective intrusion at a 
roadblock will be minimal. Most roadblocks require only a few 
minutes of the motorist's time. 59 Usually the officer speaks 
momentarily to the driver and views the interior of the 
vehicle, checking for alcohol containers and weapons. 60 Given 
the momentary and direct nature of the roadblock, it is 
unlikely that any roadblock would be invalidated on the sole 
basis of objective intrusion. 
Nearly every case assessing the constitutionality of a 
roadblock addresses the "neutral criteria" aspect of the 
roadblock operation, and bases the decision on the presence and 
comprehensiveness of the operational formula. One court 
bifurcated its consideration of the subjective intrusion into 
the element of fright and surprise and the element of 
individual officer discretion. 61 Both are considered 
oft-cited opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. 
Deskins. 62 There the Kansas court set forth thirteen 
non-exclusive factors to consider in arriving at a neutral 
criteria to reduce the subjective intrusion to an acceptable 
minimum. These include: 
the degree of discretion, if any, left to the 
officer in the field, 
the location designated for the roadblock, 
the time and duration of the roadblock, 
standards set by superior officer, 
advance notice to the public at large, 
advance warning to the individual motorist 
approaching the roadblock, 
maintenance of safety conditions, 
degree of fear or anxiety generated by the operation 
of the roadblock, 
average length of time each motorist is detained, 
11 
10) physical factors surrounding the location, type, and 
method of operation, 
11) the availability of a less intrusive means for 
combating the problem, 
12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure, 
13) any other relevant circumstances which might bear 
on the test. 63 
The Deskins court did not require that each factor be 
resolved in favor of the state. 64 Certain factors are 
crucial, such as the degree of fear generated and the 
effectiveness concern. These are among factors included in 
other courts' construction of permissible operational formulae. 
65 Each court has placed particular emhasis on the first 
factor, requiring controls on the discretion left to the field 
officer. Unbridled discretion certainly could lead to an 
intolerable level of subjective intrusion. In State v. Kirk, 
the court singled out the discretionary factor, observing that 
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 . . . participation of command or superivsory authority in 
selecting the time and place based on reasonable evidence of 
social utility is an essentail constitutional ingredient and 
necessary to satsify the objection that the traveler not be 
subject to the discretion of the official in the field." 66 
While there may be greater focus on a specific set of 
factors, no single factor is held to be determinative. As with 
any balancing test, application to a particular set of facts 
may prove difficult. 67 With no clear controlling authority 
and a multitude of factors to consider, the only avenue is to 
examine the facts and circumstances of each case. As 
illustrated by the Supreme Court, "there is no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to 
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or 
seizure) entails. " 68 The roadblock which addresses every 
minutia of constitutional law may never come to pass. Someone 
will always be prepared to Monday-morning quarterback, as the 
Supreme Court noted "(a) creative judge engaged in post hoc 
evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some 
alternative means by which the objectives of the police might 
have been accomplished..11 69 
Applying the criteria of Deskins to this case, this 
Court finds: 
1) that very little discretion was left to the 
arresting officer, Shaun Adamson; 
2) the location designated for the roadblock, at the 
mouth of American Fork Canyon, was determined by supervising 
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personnel based upon the frequency of alcohol-related problems 
or response calls; 
3) the time and duration of the roadblock were 
determined by supervisory personnel, not by on site officers; 
4) that the office of the Utah County Sheriff had 
adopted regulations respecting the operation of a roadblock; 
5) that there was no testimony respecting advance 
notice, except for extant on site signage at both ends of the 
roadblock (Sheriff's Roadblock Ahead); 
6) the roadblock was properly illuminated with alley 
lights, flashes, roadway cones, etc, and careful attention was 
given to highway safety; 
7) the average length of time each motorist was 
detained was minimal, 1-2 minutes; 
8) there was further testimony that canyons pose 
particular problems and that this location was determined based 
upon accident surveys and arrest statistics. 
CONCLUSION 
It is vital to curb the lamentable and needless deaths 
on Utah's highways attributable to the drunken driver. Without 
question there are soundly reasoned and compelling 
constitutional arguments, both state and federal, which can be 
advanced on both sides of the "public interest versus 
individual liberty" issue. But, on balance, given a properly 
administered roadblock, this Court concludes that the gravity 
of the well-documented public concern in Utah and degree to 
which the roadblock procedure facilitates detection and 
abatement of drunken drivers, outweighs the minimal level of 
interference with individual liberties. It is critical to note 
that this Court does not conclude that all extant roadblock 
procedures now being utilized by law enforcement agencies in 
the State of Utah can withstand state or federal constitutional 
scrutiny. 
This Court has suggested, as one facet of any rigorous 
analytical approach, that the roadblock activity be analyzed 
under Article I, Section 14 standards of the Constitution of 
Utah. Whether such an analysis will carry the day remains to 
be seen, but with the frequent reminders from members of the 
Utah Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of our own 
constitutional provisions, it cannot be ignored. Justice 
Zimmerman is eagerly optimistic that an independent state 
constitutional analysis will result in a simplication of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, which, in his words is a "labyrinth of 
rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing 
rationalizations and distinctions." Hygh, 271-272. While not 
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everyone shares that enthusiasm, few would fault his contention 
that state constitutional arguments should not be foreclosed 
from consideration by (the Court's) unanalyzed acceptance of 
the federal position, Hygh p. 273. The state constitutional 
considerations are inadequately briefed. 
Defendant has relied upon the leading California case 
of Inaersoll v. Palmer. The Court found that the roadblocks 
were administered as part of a regulatory scheme, authorized by 
law. The administrative or regulatory argument has no current 
applicability in the State of Utah in that Utah has no 
comparable statutory scheme. A number of state legislatures 
have enacted procedures authorizing roadblocks, People v. 
Scott, 473 N.E. 2d, 6, footnote #4. To date, the Utah 
Legislature has not chosen to do so. 
Despite the multitude of obstacles to overcome in 
constructing a constitutionally permissible roadblock, it is 
fair to conclude that a sobriety roadblock is constitutional if 
properly administered. The subject roadblock was properly 
administered. This Court supports, without reservation, the 
criteria advanced by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. 
Deskins. 71 
Because of the intricacies involved in balancing of 
interests, roadblocks must be approached on a case-by-case 
basis. Although a small number of courts have held sobriety 
roadblocks to be per se unconstitutional, this Court does not 
find their reasoning persuasive. A majority of the courts 
finding a particular roadblock unconstitutional have suggested 
or intimated ways in which the fatal defect could have been 
cured. (see appendix I) 
Based upon the above case, law defendant's Motion to 
Exlcude is hereby denied. With that decision defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss is also, hereby, denied. 
dated - ^ JT./SK- /'? 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis 
Judge, Fourth Circu i t 
I hereby c e r t i f y that I mailed a true and c o r r e c t copy 
of the above2Memorandum Decis ion , with postage thereon prepaid, 
on t h i s day of June , 1988, t o the fo l lowing 
i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s , a t the addresses i n d i c a t e d , t o - w i t : 
S h e r r i Regan 37 Eas t Center Provo, Utah 84601 
Smvmi H. Lybbei l 339 IkuLli 000 Wejfc—SalL Lake. City. Ifeah—84103— 
APPENDIX 
A Summation of Selected Cases Relevant to Roadblock Issues. 
Federal Cases: 
Delaware u. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). This case might be termed the pseudo-
seminal case construing roadblocks. A lone patrolman, without assignment or 
particular duty, decided to stop a motorist for a routine license and registration 
check. No violation had been observed. The Court found the stop to be an 
unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. Roadblocks are mentioned only 
in dicta as a possibly constitutional tool to enforce administrative concerns. The 
Court did not consider the nature of the government interest that might be 
advanced in a sobriety roadblock. While recognizing the need for neutral criteria, 
the Court did not give any guidance in what that criteria might be. Nor did the 
Court define how closely the sobriety or administrative roadblock must conform to 
the constitutionally allowed border control roadblocks. Finally, the Court did not 
address the degree to which one method of enforcement must be more effective 
than less intrusive methods. This case presents an excellent history of the 
balancing test as applied to automobile issues. 
United States u. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Supreme Court upheld 
permanently established border control roadblocks, and dismissed the necessity of 
a warrant for the checkpoints. The Court reaches its conclusions through a 
balancing of interests analysis. 
United States u. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Two Border Patrolmen 
operated a roving-stop operation, stopping the defendants because they appeared 
to be of Mexican descent. The Court upheld such a stop, when based on 
reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing. The Court stressed that in allowing stops to 
be made with less than probable cause, the investigation must not depart from the 
initial focus, absent the establishment of probable cause to do so. 
Brown u. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The defendant was arrested for possession of 
narcotics after being stopped on a routine traffic inspection. In this case, the 
Court cohesively explains the factors that apply to a fourth amendment balancing 
test. 
Almeida-Sanchez u. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Court held that 
roving patrols by border agents were not exempt from warrant and probable cause 
requirements, when such patrols were conducted away from the border or its 
functional equivalent. 
United States u. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 981 (1975). The Fourth Amendment was held to 
prohibit searches of private vehicles at traffic checkpoints removed from the 
border or functional equivalent, absent consent or probable cause. 
United States u. Pritchard, 645 F.2d 854, (10th Cir.), cert, denied* 454 U.S. 832 
(1981). While this case is controlling in the local circuit, no substantive analysis 
in undertaken, although the subject roadblock was upheld. 
State Cases: 
Commonwealth v. McCeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.£.2d 349 (1983). The 
roadblock in question was held unconstitutional on the grounds of insufficient 
warning devices, lighting and police presence. Officer discretion was also found 
to be excessive. A formula for acceptable roadblocks was advanced. 
Commonwealth u. Trumble, 396 Mass, 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985). The roadblock 
was held constitutional when it followed a detailed directive promulgated by the 
Secretary of Public Safety. The approved plan is contained in the case appendix. 
Higbie u. State, 723 S.W.2d .802 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). When a driver's license 
checkpoint was a subterfuge for a sobriety roadblock, it was found 
unconstitutional. The court strongly condemned the subterftige, and did not rule 
out constitutionally permissible roadblocks. 
Ingersoll u. Palmer, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299 (1987). In this civil action, 
the California Supreme Court affirmed roadblocks when executed incompliance 
with California statutes, and when the roadblock met the safety and operational 
criteria in the state codes. 
In re Richard T., 185 Cal. App. 3d 732, 229 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1986). The court 
suppressed evidence obtained at a sobriety roadblock on the grounds that no 
warrant had been obtained to operate the roadblock. 
Jones u. State, 459 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. App. 1984). The court suppressed roadblock 
evidence when the state failed to show proper planning and neutral criteria in the 
operation of the roadblock. The court held that sobriety roadblocks could pass 
constitutional tests, if executed according to acceptable criteria. 
Little u. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984). Gravity of the DUI problem 
and carefully crafted regulations were cited by the court in holding that the 
sobriety roadblock was not violative of the Fourth Amendment, and no warrant 
was required. Authority to conduct the roadblock was based on the common law 
right of arrest. 
Lowe u. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1985). The court sustained a 
roadblock where the officers were required to stop every car and check for 
driver's licenses and intoxication. 
Nelson u. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987). The court invalidated 
the use of roadblocks based on the absence of statutory authority, and held that 
common law or general police power statutes were not sufficient. 
People u. Bartley, 109 IU. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 380 (1985). The Illinois Supreme 
Court reversed the Illinois Appellate court which found roadblocks to be per se 
unconstitutional. The court found that the state had a ,,compeiling,t interest in 
detecting DUI drivers. The subjective and objective intrusions were of primary 
concern to the court in exercising the balancing test. 
People u. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1 (1984). The court held that a 
roadblock would be permissible as long as neutral criteria were followed. The 
court recognized the diminished expectation to privacy in a vehicle. Significant 
reliance was given to the county sheriffs comprehensive written plan. 
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be invalid when the roadblock was a subterfuge for other purposes and the state 
police attempted to "piggy-back" statutory authority from the fish and game police 
in conducting the roadblock. 
People u. John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864 (1982). In this roadblock 
every vehicle in a particular area was followed and stopped for questioning about 
burglaries in the area. While the court found this to be a significant intrusion, 
the roadblock was upheld. The court stated that the roving roadblock seemed to 
be the most effective method in combatting the burglary problem. The officers 
had limited discretion and followed a uniform procedure. 
State u. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d 461 (1986). A roadblock initiated by a 
field sergeant and 4 officers was found to be excessively arbitrary, since the 
officers operating the roadblock chose the time, place and method used. 
State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 539, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983). This court supported a 
roadblock analyzing the roadblock in terms of implied police power, state 
constitutional grounds (the Kansas state constitutional provision is identical to 
that of Utah), and the Fourth Amendment. The court advanced a set of criteria 
(see notes). 
State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983). The 
court considered the amount of field officer discretion, lack of empirical support 
for roadblock efficacy, and lack of established guidelines to find a roadblock 
unconstitutional. 
State u. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1986). The Indiana Supreme Court held 
roadblocks to be constitutional when fixed, non-arbitrary procedures were 
followed. The case overruled State u. McLaughlin^ 471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. App. 
1984). 
State u. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984). A roadblock with 
experienced and trained officers, when following a specific administrative order, 
was upheld. The intrusion was slight and brief, with additional questioning based 
upon probable cause developed in the initial interview. 
State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (1985). The court held that any 
constitutional objection to a roadblock could be overcome by following non-
arbitrary criteria, formulated by administrative officers. The court focused on 
limiting the discretion of field officers. The state constitution was followed in 
reaching the court's decision, finding that to be a more appropriate vehicle than 
the Fourth Amendment. 
State v. Kretchmar, 201 Neb. 308, 267 N.W.2d 740 (1978). Even though an officer 
may have specific suspicion which might not justify a stop, a stop at a roadblock 
will be constitutional if the officer follows criteria in a non-arbitrary fashion. 
When driver's license and registration checks are conducted in accordance with 
state statute, they are proper. 
State u. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980). A roadblock was held 
unconstitutional when conducted by 2 field officers without supervisory planning 
or authorization, and no warning signals or illumination were used. The court 
suggested criteria which would have cured the fatal defects isee notes). 
A-3 
State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 M9flfv> Tha #^..^ \™~\\A~*-A 
a roadblock operated by 2 troopers on their own initiative. A state policy had 
been formulated, but the court found it to be inadequate, since it allowed 
officers nearly unlimited discretion in operating roadblocks. The court stated 
that the statutes and regulations were not sufficiently specific in addressing the 
balancing of interests. 
State u. Muziky 379 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. App. 1985). The court suppressed evidence 
from a roadblock because the state did not meet the burden of showing that less 
intrusive methods were not as effective and that there was little attempt to 
lessen the fear and apprehension generated by the roadblock. 
State u. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Cr. 1984). The court held sobriety roadblocks 
to be per se unconstitutional. Little analysis is offered* in the opinion. 
State u. TourtillotU 289 Or. 835,^618 P.2d 423 (1980). The state interest in 
enforcing game laws was sufficient to justify the roadblock at which the 
defendant was arrested* The roadblock was authorized statute and the discretion 
was limited. 
Webb u. Statey 695 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. App. 1985). The court found a driver's 
license checkpoint, operated on a street with bars, to be a subterfuge, when the 
officers stopped motorists and failed to ask for driver's licenses. The court 
condemned the practice of spurious driver's license checkpoints. 
NOTES 
1. In a "non-roadblock" case the Utah Supreme Court inciinaced that a 
roadblock might be constitutionally permissible under exigent circumstances. 
The court did not address administrative or sobriety roadblocks. State u. 
Torres, 29 Utah 2d 27 U 508 P.2d 534, 535 (1973). 
2. Decisions of District and Circuit Courts: 
a) West Valley City a. Lujan. Judge Michael Burton, 5th Circuit Court, 
West Valley City Department, upheld the constitutionality of the 
roadblock. 
b) West Valley City </. Lujan. Civil No. CRA 34-85, Judge Scott Daniels, 
Third District Court, affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court. 
c) State u. Crary, Case No. CRA 33-32, Judge J. Dennis Frederick, Third 
District Court, found the search and seizure unreasonable and reversed 
the decision of Judge Bailey Sainsbury, Fifth Circuit Court, Murray 
Department. 
d) Holt v. Schwendiman, Civil No. CS4-2955 < Appeal from a driver license 
revocation hearing;. Judge Scott Daniels. Tliird District Court, in a 
memorandum deasioa, ruled that the subject mass roadblock stop 
constituted an "unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.'* 
e) State v. Zisumbo, Case No. 020534. Judge W. Brent West, Third Circuit 
Court, Roy Department, granted a motion to suppress all evidence 
gathered from a roadblock stop. The court agreed with the analysis 
set out by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in State u. Smith. 674 P.2d 562 
(Okla. 1984), and the Illinois Aopeilace Court in People u. Bartley, 466 
N.£.2d 346 (DL App. 1984). 
3. U.C.A. 17.22-2(1963). 
6. U.C.A. 32A-U-15 (1953)f as amended-
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304 Or. 139, 743 P.2d 715 (1987). 
9. Ingersollu. Palmer Cai. 3 d _ , 241 Cai. Rptr. 42.743 P.2d 1299(1987;. 
10. State I/. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 565 lOkia. Crim. App. 1984). 
11. People u. Estrada, 68 I1L App. 3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 123, 133-34 < 1979.. 
12. Nelson u. Lane County, 304 Or. 97. 103, 743 P.2d 692. 695 (19S7\ 
13. U.C.A. 77-7-15 (1953), as amended. 
14. U.C.A. 10-3-915 (1953), as amended. 
15. See generally. United States y. BisweiL 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Wyman y. James, 
400 U.S. 309 (1971); Colonnade Corp. y. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), 
See y. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara y. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523 (1967); United States y. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973); United 
States y. Schafer, 461 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1972); Downing y. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 
1230 (6th Cir. 1972). 
16. Colonnade Corp. y. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
17. Nelson u. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 103, 743 P.2d 692, 695 (1987) (fn. 2). 
18. State y. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); State y. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 
459 A.2d 641 (1983); see generally, Brennan, State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977), Developments in 
the Law— Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 
1324 (1982). 
19. State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 23, 493 A.2d 1271. 1274 (1985). 
20. 493 A.2d at 1274. 
21. State y. Koppel, N.H. , 499 A.2d 977 (1985). 
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24. Delaware y. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
25. Brown y. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
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Larocco, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1987); State v. Mendoza, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 
24 (1987); State o. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984); State y. Trujillo, 739 
P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987); State u. Torres., 508 P.2d 534 (Utah 1973). 
27. Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294, 297 (Miss. 1986). 
23. See generally, United States y. Martinez-Fuerte, 423 U.S. 543 (1976), Terry 
y. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968), Delaware a. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). 
29. Almeida-Sanchez y. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell J., 
concurring). 
30. New Jersey v. TLO, 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 U985). 
31. In 1963, the Supreme Court articulated a lower "reasonable suspicion19 
standard in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1963). Border searches have been 
upheld as valid to detect undocumented aliens. United States u. Martinez-
Fuerte, 423 U.S. 523 (1976). Inspections to detect violations of health codes, 
building codes and industrial hygiene standards (for certain industries). See 
generally, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (building code 
inspections held valid without particularized suspicion of violation); Donovan 
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (holding mine warrantless general inspection 
of mines to not require particular suspicion); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 
U.S. 307 (1978) (by virtue of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
Labor Department inspectors may enter and insoect any work area subject to 
the Act's provisions). In McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1973), 
the court upheld magnetometer (metal detector) inspection of persons 
entering a courtroom since the search was reasonable necessary to ensure 
security, and was not a subterfuge to gather information for criminal 
prosecution. The unfettered stopping and boarding of ships in U.S. coastal 
waters has been upheld in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 
2573 (1983). The Court compared the inspections to those of highly 
regulated industries, such as liquor distilleries and firearms manufacturers. 
32. Carroll u. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
33. Id. at 153-54. 
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
35. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1973). 
36. The Court has been consistent in applying the balancing analysis when 
automobile searches and seizures are at issue. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prou$e, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 423 U.S. 543 (1976) 
(expectation of privacy in an automobile is not as great as that in a 
personal residence); United States u. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
37. Brown u. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979). 
38. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979), see also, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 373-83 (1975). 
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42. 23 U.S.C. § 408(1982). 
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44. Perez u. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 672 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(footnote omitted). 
45. See, e.g.. Slate v. Superior CL In and For the County of Pima, 143 Az. 45, 
691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1985); State v. McClaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1136 (Ind. 
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46. See, Drunk Driving in America, Study by Insurance Information Institute, 
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such as monitoring of court sentencing for convicted offenders, public 
information campaigns, civil actions, pledges not to drink after drinking. In 
Utah, REDDl (Report Every Drunk Driver Immediately) is promoted through 
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Trans. Safety Bd., Safety Study- Deterrence of Drunk Driving: The Role of 
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(Doc/US TD 1.127:34/01). 
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Paper. 
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recommended strict DUI law package. It would be unreasonable to consider 
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anyone from the prosecution? 
ilre you Ann Searle? 
MS. SLASLL: Yes. 
THii COURT: Yes, ma'an. 
MS. SEARLS; I know Sherry Ra<ran. 
THE COURT: And what is the nature of that 
acquaintanceship? 
2-IS. SEARLE: Ue taught at the same elcr.er.cary 
9
 I school. 
10
















MS. StiARLE; It's been oh, ten years ago or so. 
THE COURT: And were y o u — h o w ^ould you 
characterize your friendship? Were you real close-— 
MS. SEARLE; No. 
THE COURT: — o r did you just know her as another 
teacher? 
MS. SEARLE: Just know who--uh huh (affirr.ative) . 
THL COURT: T/ould you have any tendency to favor 
the State in this natter because ."he's the prosecutor, as 
opposed to the defense? 
M S . SEARLE: Ho. 
TEE COURT: You think that you could be totally 
fair and inpartial? 
MS. SEARLE: Yes. 



























different* If *£Q\± fe^I that it's morally wronq to dxirtk ^ 
alcoholic beverage or beer, please raise your hand. Thank 
you. 
rjr. Gottfreason/ given that belief, do you still 
feel that you can be fair and impartial in this case today? 
;!?.• GGTiFP.bDSOP: I thin*' :-:o. I've served in a—. 
as a bishop and in bishoprics for 13 years, and I've 
counseled a lot of people about things like this because of 
the problems that it c?.us£* in their home. 
lio cvrcj of. tAve. ^-vr.<-\r^  bv-.",.i<»Tr<* t.K-\t. b^-c^^o. ^  ^x^tm 
is accused of a violation °- the lav/ that that person is 
guilty unless he can show otherwise? Do any of you have 
that feeling or opinion? 
•XI. ZilCbR: You*-' Honor, I believe llr. Hinckley 
might, havo also had hi* h ^ d r^isel. 
•1'Kb COUV.T: On hhe -.vuestr'on, do you think it's 
morally wrong to drink an alcoholic beverage or beer; did 
you raise your hand on chat,, llr. Hinckley? 
I'm sorry, I didn't—I f,m not as observant as 1 
^1\OM1& b<£. TLi\ o^ i-tAi of v:^t. be.Vbef , do *jcvvs> s>t.iLL f^el ^ au> 
can be fair and impartial to both sides, given your earlier 
response that we have on the record on the other matter 
involving the accident ^m?>* T-'i^ had? 
121. illii'CIZiiiY; i think it's morally wrong, but I 
">*3 
